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6.1  Introduction 
The issue of total employee compensation is important both to applied 
labor economists and to economists interested in the size distribution of 
labor income and workers’ economic well-being. Unfortunately, neither 
group has been afforded the luxury of a nationally representative data set 
for individual workers which  allowed them to measure  and value  all 
major components of  wage and nonwage compensation. 
In empirical studies of  the return to labor effort, commonly utilized 
household surveys, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), the 
National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), and the Panel Study of  Income 
Dynamics (PSID), have only recently begun to record individual work- 
er’s benefit  recipiency information for major  types of  nonwage  com- 
pensation, such as pension rights and health insurance. But none of these 
data bases records the dollar amount which employers “contribute”  on 
behalf of  employees.’ On the other hand, the Bureau of  Labor Statistics 
(BLS) has conducted  several establishment surveys, such as the 1977 
Employer’s Expenditure for Employee Compensation Survey (EEEC) 
and the  1977 Employment  Cost  Index  Survey  (ECI) which  provide 
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aggregate employer outlays for several detailed types of  wage and non- 
wage compensation, such as vacation and holiday pay and pensions, but 
no information on their distribution across individual workers. 
In this paper we present the initial results of  assigning recipiency and 
dollar values for various types of wage and nonwage compensation from 
BLS establishment surveys to individuals in the March 1980 CPS, using 
microdata simulation techniques.*  This new data base is used to answer 
three questions: 
1. How do the employer cost and employee value of fringe benefits 
differ between  themselves and between  other measures  of  worker 
compensation for different types of  workers? 
2.  How do fringe benefits affect the size distribution of  total com- 
pensation as compared to the size distribution of  wages and salaries? 
3.  How does the definition of  employee compensation affect the 
results of a standard human capital model or “earnings function” of the 
type employed in much of  the empirical labor economics literature? 
Section 6.2 presents the definitions of  compensation, fringe benefits, 
and other terms used in this paper, along with data on their aggregate 
value and growth, and the limitations of  this study. Section 6.3 briefly 
outlines a heuristic model of  the employer-employee compensation de- 
termination process which establishes the difference between employer 
cost and employee value. Empirical proxies for employer cost and em- 
ployee value are presented in section 6.4.  Section 6.5 presents the empir- 
ical results which suggest answers to the three questions listed above, 
while section 6.6  summarizes the results and discusses the application of 
this technique for future research in related areas. The appendix contains 
a detailed discussion of the simulation procedures used to match the BLS 
data to the CPS. 
6.2  Definitions of Terms: Fringe Benefits and 
Their Growth and Importance 
Fringe benefits will be defined as the amount of total employee hourly 
compensation not  received as pay for time worked, but paid by  em- 
ployers to employees for time not  worked, or paid  by  employers to 
intermediaries on behalf of   employee^.^ Payments for time not worked 
include vacation and holiday pay and other payments for nonproduction 
bonuses, for paid sick leave, and for severance pay. These items are 
already included in the money wages, salaries, or earnings (we use these 
interchangeably  below) usually recorded in household  surveys, along 
with pay for time worked: straight time pay, overtime pay, and shift 
differential. Payments made to intermediaries, such as insurance com- 
panies, are termed nonwage compensation or supplements to wages and 
salaries. These supplements are of  two types: First, legally required 239  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
payments, such as social security payroll taxes, unemployment insurance, 
and workers’ compensation contributions, are included in supplements to 
wages and salaries. Second, supplements in the form of  deferred com- 
pensation, such as employer pension and retirement contributions and 
employer contributions to thrift or savings plans are included here, as 
are insurance  contributions for health, life,  and sickness  or accident 
insurance. Altogether wages and salaries (including both pay for time 
worked  and pay for time not worked)  plus  supplements equals total 
compensation. 
Table 6.1 presents estimates of  the aggregate value of total employee 
compensation, as we have defined it, for the private nonfarm economy 
from  1966 to 1979. The 1966 and 1976 estimates are taken from the 
Handbook of  Labor Statistics 1978 (1979), while the 1979 estimates are 
taken from the 1977 EEEC, adjusted to 1979 using the ECI. These 1979 
figures are the aggregate control values used  in  the microsimulation 
model. Both sets of data are normalized to indicate various components 
of  compensation as a percent of  aggregate wages and salaries in each 
year. 
Several interesting patterns are suggested by  table 6.1. The overall 
average difference between the most narrow measure of labor compensa- 
tion (pay for time worked) and the broadest measure (total compensa- 
tion) has grown from 18.9 percentage points as recently as 1966, to 29.5 
percentage points by 1979. While pay for time worked has fallen slightly 
as a fraction of  wages  and salaries, mainly  because of  the increasing 
fraction of  wages and salaries attributed to vacation and holiday pay, 
supplements have been growing at a more rapid rate. Legally required 
benefits have increased by 3.4 percentage points or nearly 60 percent 
from 1966 to 1979, largely due to the 2.2 percentage point increases in 
social security and railroad retirement payroll taxes (in parentheses in 
table 6.  l),  but also due to increases in unemployment insurance contribu- 
tions. In terms of  percentage change from 1966 to 1979, the two most 
rapidly rising elements of  compensation are insurance contributions and 
deferred compensation which grew by 2.9 and 2.4 percentage points (or 
by  126.1 and 98.1 percent), respectively, over this period. As several 
researchers (Kennedy and Vogell979; Woodbury 1981; Clotfelter 1981) 
have noted, rising marginal tax rates, rising income, and other factors 
discussed more fully below have led employees to favor these nontaxable 
forms of  compensation over wages and ~alaries.~  Due to growth in these 
supplements, total compensation  was  almost  20  percent  larger  than 
wages in 1979. 
While table 6.1 indicates a rapid rate of growth both in fringe benefits 
and, particularly, in supplements to  wages and salaries, these figures only 
represent  aggregate employer contributions as a percent of  aggregate 
wages and salaries. Such estimates mask the variance in benefits, even 240  Timothy M. heeding 
Table 6.1  Change in Relative Components of Total Compensation in the 
Private Nonfarm Economy: 1966-1979 
Component of 
Total Compensation 
Components of  Total Compensation 
as Percentage of  Wages and Salaries 
1966  1976  1979 
Pay for time worked" 
Vacations and holidaysb 
Other payments' 
Total wages and salariesd 
Supplements to wages and salaries: 
Legally required contributions" 


































Sources:  1966, 1976: Handbook of  Labor Statistics (1979), table 113. 1979: 1977 EEEC 
adjusted to 1979 using the ECI; adjusted March 1980 CPS data tapes. 
"Pay for time worked includes straight time wages and salaries, overtime, and shift differen- 
tials. 
bVacations and holidays include vacation and holiday pay and other paid leave, except for 
sick leave. 
'Other  payments include nonproduction bonuses, sick leave, and severance pay. 
dTotal  wages and salaries includes all direct (before tax) payments to workers, i.e., the sum 
of  pay  for  time  worked, vacations  and holidays,  and other payments  as recorded  on 
household income surveys such as the CPS. 
'Legally  required  contributions  include  employer  contributions  for social security and 
railroad retirement, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, and other manda- 
tory payments. 
'Insurance contributions include employer payments for life, accident, private disability, 
and health insurance. 
gDeferred  compensation  includes employer contributions  for pension plans, retirement 
plans, and savings and thrift plans. 
hTotal  compensation includes all listed components of  total worker compensation: wages 
and salaries plus all supplements. 
the benefit variance which can be observed on as simple a level as average 
increases in compensation for those actually receiving these benefits as 
compared to those who do  not. For instance, pension and retirement plan 
contributions make up 95 percent of deferred compensation. Of all wage 
and salary workers in the private nonfarm economy, 44.6 percent were 
covered  in  1979 by  a pension plan to which their employer or union 
~ontributed.~  For these covered workers, the average employer contribu- 
tion was 11.4 percent of  wages and salaries. Following a similar proce- 
dure for health insurance (which makes up roughly 80 percent of  total 
insurance contributions) indicates an average employer contribution of 241  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
7.4 percent for those with subsidized health insurance coverage. Thus, 
while these two components of  Compensation average 9.2 percent of 
wages and salaries across all workers during 1979, they average more 
than twice as large an amount, or 18.8 percent, for the 37.8 percent of 
workers covered by both types of  plans, even before taking account of 
intraindustry and intraoccupational differences in the level of  pension 
and health insurance contributions. Other data sources suggest even 
wider differentials  across specific groups of  firms and workers  (e.g., 
Chamber of  Commerce of the United States 1980). To the extent that the 
microsimulation model used in this paper can capture these differentials, 
it appears that different measures of  employee compensation will pro- 
duce substantial differences between various types of workers as well as 
large dollar differences between various measures of  compensation. 
Before we begin our analysis it is important to keep the limitations of 
this effort in mind. First and most importantly, the measure of  “total” 
compensation used in this paper does not include fringe benefits in-kind, 
such as free or employer subsidized meals, parking, personal use of cars, 
entertainment, travel, and so on; nor does it include other job amenities, 
such as office size or location and flexibility of work schedule. At this time 
there are limited data on even aggregate values of  these forms of  com- 
pensation, much less indicators of the types of workers who receive such 
“perks” or the distribution of their dollar value across various recipients.6 
Second, due to lack of  appropriate data self-employed persons and all 
government workers are excluded from our analysis. 
6.3  A Heuristic Model of Employer-Employee Benefit Determination 
The decision to accept a job involves a worker who provides a given 
amount of labor services in exchange for an employer’s compensation. In 
general this compensation can be broken into four components: wage 
goods, i.e., market purchased goods, W; fringe benefit goods, B;  working 
conditions, i.e., job amenities not included in fringe benefits, A;  and 
leisure, L.’  The value of  a job, or the utility derived from a job, to a 
worker can therefore be expressed as: 
U=  U(W,  B,  A,  L). 
In the model which follows we examine the trade-off between Wand B, 
largely ignoring A and L.8 
In accepting a job, a worker in effect makes a tied purchase of a given 
set of W,  B,  A,  and L.  In general, following the work of Rosen (1974), the 
choice is  made  according to a worker’s subjective evaluation  of  the 
objectively measure characteristics of  this package. This hedonic model 
of  the labor market is characterized by  a set of  firms offering various 
compensation packages in hopes of attracting a worker whose productive 242  Timothy M. Smeeding 
characteristics (training, appearance, physical and mental abilities, etc.) 
most closely match those sought by the firm. In the  job bargaining process 
firms compete with one another for workers by offering different com- 
pensation  packages  or adjusting  those  which  are already  available. 
Adjustments in compensation packages are not costless and so, ceteris 
paribus, employers only provide more of a given compensation compo- 
nent, e.g., time off  with pay or more generous pension plans, in lieu of 
lesser quantities of other components, e.g., shared offices or  lower wages 
(e.g., see Rice 1966; Lester 1967; Steuerle 1979; Atrostic 1982). Em- 
ployees evaluate the available packages and choose the package that 
maximizes equation (1). In a competitive economy, this interaction of 
workers and employers and the compensation package adjustment pro- 
cess results in a locus of job matches which trace out the rate at which the 
market trades off wage goods and benefits for various groups of workers 
at the margin. These marginal rates of  exchange represent the implicit 
hedonic prices of  various job and compensation package components. 
Income tax advantages and two types of  “scale” factors, economies of 
scale in  pension  funds and economies of  scale and group  rating  for 
insurance, increase the value of  untaxed benefits (or lower their implicit 
price) to employees, relative to their cost to employers. Employees can 
avoid  personal  income  taxation  for most  employer provided  supple- 
ments, particularly insurance and pensions-and  also for such items as 
employer social security contributions. Scale economies allow the em- 
ployer to either lower the cost of a given benefit or to offer a higher level 
of  benefits for a given outlay. However, because employers do not, in 
general, avoid corporate or personal income taxation  by  rearranging 
their mix of  benefits and wages, while employees do enjoy such advan- 
tages, we assume that the relative value of  benefits to employees rises 
above the employers’ cost of  providing benefits. 
Finally, we must admit the possibility of  nonoptimal situations, at least 
for some workers. For instance, due to immobility, rigidities, customs, or 
habit, available wage-benefit packages may force some workers to accept 
some type(s) of  fringe benefits whose characteristics they value below 
market prices. A good example might be duplicate fully employer funded 
family  health  insurance  policies  for  two  working  spouses,  whereby 
(ignoring the chance of  layoff) one spouse’s policy is virtually worthless. 
Such cases are not unlike the situation faced by many in-kind transfer 
recipients, e.g., low-income elderly who benefit from costly medicare and 
medicaid insurance. In both this latter situation and in the case of  the 
doubly insured family, the beneficiary would  accept a different wage- 
benefit package (or a lesser amount of cash transfers) and remain equally 
as well off, or better off, than at present. Thus we cannot ignore the 
possibility  of  a  “cash  equivalent”  problem.  While  in-kind  transfers 
valued by recipients below their market value may persist indefinitely, if, 243  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
for instance, donor (taxpayer) preferences insisted upon such transfers, 
labor market disequilibriums of this sort should soon disappear as em- 
ployers realize that, by offering workers some choice between current 
types of  health insurance policies and other less costly wage or benefit 
packages which do not include health insurance, they can lower their 
compensation costs while still making workers better off. 
In summary, because of  tax advantages for fringe benefits and the 
savings from scale economies and group rating economies, any given mix 
of  compensation characteristics carries with it two distinct dollar value 
measures: employer cost and employee value. The next section presents 
empirical proxies for these and other measures of  employer compen- 
sation. 
6.4  Empirical Measures of Fringe Benefits 
and Other Forms of Compensation 
Empirical measures of the value of total compensation and its compo- 
nents can be readily derived. For any employer, let: 
n 
C(TC) = C  PB;B,  + Pw.  W, 
1=1  (2) 
where the employer cost of  total compensation for any given employee, 
C(TC), is equal to the sum total of dollar amounts of  benefits, PB;B,, for 
any given benefit i(i  = 1,2,  . . . ,  n),  and wages, Pw  W,  where PB,  and Pw 
are the prices of  benefits (BJ and wage goods (W). 
We define the employee value of the compensation package, V(TC) for 
any employee as: 
V(TC) = 2 PBi  *  Bi  . (t  + Si) + Pw  *  W, 
i= 1  (3) 
where t and Si capture tax and scale advantages, respectively, by convert- 
ing the value of benefits into equivalent pretax wages through their effect 
on relative prices. And t = 1/(1 -  tm),  where tm is the marginal federal 
personal income tax rate on wages and other taxable money income for 
any given workere9 
Because tm I  1, t L 1. The t factor estimates the additional amount of 
taxable wages necessary to leave the employee with after-tax income 
sufficient to purchase the same level of benefits which he now enjoys, at 
competitive market prices.’O Si> 0 also, indicating that, even in the ab- 
sence of  tax  advantages, an  employee could not  purchase  the same 
package of  benefits at the same price as the employer, because group 
rating and scale economies lower prices to employers. Thus Si  represents 
the differentially higher prices that an employee would have to pay to 
purchase this same level of benefits. Together, the factor (t  + Si)  2  1  then, 244  Timothy M. Smeeding 
indicating that  V(TC) 2  C(TC) because the ratio  of  employer prices 
(r  subscript) for wage goods to benefits, PwrIPBi,,  differs from the em- 
ployee price ratio (e subscript), PwelPBie,  due to the fact that Pwe= 
Pw,..(t + Si). 
Each of  these measures of  total compensation can be compared to 
wages and salaries (WSAL) alone for each worker: 
(4)  WSAL= Pw  *  W, 
or to pay for time worked (PTW) where: 
(5)  PTW = WSAL -  VHOL -  OP, 
and VHOL is vacation and holiday pay, and OP is equal to other (sever- 
ance, bonus, and sick) pay included in wages, as defined in section 6.2. 
Wages and salaries are a relevant point of comparison for both V(TC) 
and C(TC) because it is often used as a proxy for either (or both) of these 
measures of compensation. Pay for time worked is, however, less appeal- 
ing as a measure of the employee value of  compensation. But in order to 
examine the size distribution of fringe benefits as we have defined them, 
pay for time worked must be subtracted from the employee value (or 
employer cost) of compensation. Further, in models of household work 
behavior where time and subsidized leisure become important variables, 
pay for time worked may be a more relevant measure of “earnings” than 
wages and salaries. To the extent that lesser amounts of  vacations and 
holidays can be substituted for higher hourly rates of pay, hourly money 
wages for various workers may be quite different if measured on a pay for 
time worked  basis as compared to a wage and salary basis. Workers 
whose wages and salaries differ least  from pay  for time worked,  as 
measured in equations (4) and (5),  respectively, receive less benefits in 
the form of time off with pay and other types of wage Compensation than 
do those with the largest differences. 
In equations (2) and (3) the value of benefits, PBi.  Bi,  will be measured 
by the individual components of supplements: insurance, deferred, and 
legally required contributions. However, readers may prefer to differ- 
entiate between these types of  compensation. Insurance and deferred 
compensation are bargained upon by workers and employers and differ 
widely across firms. On the other hand, legally required benefits are 
nonnegotiable components of  compensation. Moreover, in  calculating 
the employee value, V(TC), we will not be able to estimate the extent of 
nonoptimal situations at this time. The data needed to establish a work- 
er’s marginal rate of  substitution between wage goods and benefits are 
not available. Assuming that hedonic prices or benefits levels adjust to 
competitive equilibrium, we would not find such situations to be wide- 
spread. For instance, the growth of  “cafeteria” plans which allow work- 
ers to choose from various equal-cost bundles of  benefits is a manifes- 245  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
tation  of  this hedonic  adjustment process. But in  the case of  legally 
required contributions, no adjustments can be made. In particular, due to 
the vagaries and long-run prospects for social security, younger workers 
may value employer (and employee) contributions far below their cost. 
On the other hand, Burkhauser and Turner (1981) have recently demon- 
strated that older workers may value these contributions in excess of  an 
equal amount of wages due to the current social security benefit formulas 
(e.g. ,  rules for spouse’s benefits). Similarly, workers in cyclical industries 
may place a high value on unemployment insurance contributions while 
those in more stable job situations may find them virtually worthless. 
Because experience rating does not fully compensate for these differ- 
ences (see Feldstein  1978), employees in cyclical industries may put a 
value on unemployment insurance above the employer cost. Because we 
have no estimates of  the marginal rate of  substitution between wage 
goods and benefits, and because labor markets cannot easily adjust these 
forms of  compensation to suit ’employee and employer preferences, we 
will compute a second measure of the employee value of total compensa- 
tion: 
(6)  V(TC)X = V(TC) -  LR * t , 
and a second measure of the employer cost of  total compensation: 
(7)  C(TC)X = C(TC) -  LR , 
which simply measure the value of total compensation, V(TC)X, or the 
employer cost, C(TC)X, disregarding employers’ legally required con- 
tributions (LR). 
In total, we will analyze the six measures of  worker compensation 
indicated in equations (2)-(7).  In addition, we will examine two mea- 
sures of the value of fringe benefits alone: either fringe benefits valued at 
employer cost, [C(TC) -  PTW], or at employee value, [V(TC) -  PTW]. 
More benefit-specific definitions for these variables, including the sched- 
ule of scale effects for pension contributions, and scale and group rating 
effects for health, life, and sickness or accident insurance, and a detailed 
explanation of  the simulation methodologies employed to estimate the 
various  components of  employee  compensation can  be found in the 
appendix. 
6.5  Results 
The measures of  compensation described above were used to answer 
three different questions: What are the differences between employer 
cost and employee value of fringe benefits and other measures of com- 
pensation? What is the effect of fringe benefits on the size distribution of 246  Timothy M. Smeeding 
earnings? What is the importance of  different definitions of  compensa- 
tion in a standard human capital framework? We shall treat each in turn. 
6.5.1 
Tables 6.2 through 6.5 present median levels of total compensation in 
the private nonfarm economy in 1979 for workers of different race, sex, 
and work status groups (tables 6.2 and 6.3); and for different occupa- 
tional groups of  workers (tables 6.4 and 6.5). In order to separate the 
effects of  averaging measures of compensation for those with substantial 
levels of  benefits and those without, tables 6.3 and 6.5 contain median 
compensation measures only for workers who receive both pension and 
health insurance benefits. In the private nonfarm economy, 37.8 percent 
of all workers, and 54.6 percent of all full-year full-time workers, receive 
both employer provided health insurance and pension benefits. In addi- 
tion, workers with both types of benefits are more likely to receive other 
types of  insurance coverage, sick pay, and other benefits than are other 
workers. Six measures of compensation are presented: wages and salaries 
(the standard measure of  earnings); pay for time worked; the employer 
cost of  total compensation (with and without legally required contribu- 
tions); and the employee value of  total compensation (with and without 
legally required benefits). In addition, we have calculated median levels 
of fringe benefits (total compensation minus pay for time worked) valued 
at employer cost and at employee value. 
Median fringe benefits measured at employee value were $3099 (or 
34.5 percent of  wages) for all workers and $5208 (or 37.5 percent of 
wages) for full-year full-time workers in 1979 (table 6.2). Restricting the 
universe to employees with both health insurance and pension benefits in 
table 6.3 raises overall median benefits at employee value to $6866 (or 
44.0 percent of wages and salaries) for all such workers and to $7239 (or 
42.8 percent of wages and salaries) for all such full-year full-time work- 
ers. Workers with health insurance and pension benefits received more 
than twice as high a dollar amount in benefits ($6866 vs. $3099) and 9.5 
more percentage points in total benefits relative to wages than did the 
overall average worker.  Because  workers with  health insurance  and 
pension benefits (table 6.3) are included among all workers (table 6.2) 
much wider differences would be found if  we were to calculate median 
benefits for the 35.6 percent of workers with neither health insurance nor 
pension benefits. 
Considering all workers in table 6.2, men received a higher dollar 
amount and a higher percent of salary in fringe benefits than did women. 
The ratio of female to male salary is 47.0 percent, while their ratio of 
fringe benefits at employee value is only 39.5 percent. However this 
substantial percent  difference  disappears  totally when restricting  the 
universe to all full-year full-time workers in table 6.2. Moreover, when 
Comparing Employer Cost and Employee Value Table 6.2  Ditferent Measures of Median Compensation by  Sex, Race, and Work Status in 1W9 
Total Compensation 
without Legally 
Total Compensation  Required  Total Fringe Benefits 
Wages  Pay for 
SexiRace 
and  Time  Employer  Employee  Employer  Employee  Employee  Employer 
Salary  Worked  cost  Value  cost  Value  Value  cost 
AN  workers: 
Both sexes  $  8,974 
Males  13,047 
Females  6,154 
(femaleimale  3 100)  (47.0) 
Blacks  7,681 
Whites  9,208 
(blackiwhite  100)  (83.4) 
Full-year  full-time" workers only: 
Both sexes  13,884 
Males  17,148 
Females  9,784 
(femalehale .  100)  (57.1) 













































































Source: Adjusted March 1980 CPS data tapes. 
"Full-year full-time workers work thirty-five or more hours per week for fifty weeks or more per year. Table 6.3  Different Measures of Median Compensation by Sex, Race, and Work Status for Workers with Both Health Insurance and 
Pension Coverage in 1979 
SexlRace 
Total Compensation 
without Legally  Percent of 
Total Compensation  Required  Total Fringe Benefits  All Workers 
Wages  Pay for  with Health 
and  Time  Employer  Employee  Employer  Employee  Employee  Employer  Insurance 
Salary  Worked  Cost  Value  cost  Value  Value  Cost  and Pension 
All workers: 
Both sexes  $15,577 
Males  18,546 
Females  10,352 
(femalelmale  100)  (55.8) 
Blacks  12,218 
Whites  15,394 
Full-year full-time" workers only: 
Both sexes  16,899 
Males  19,761 
Females  11,408 
(black/white *  100)  (79.4) 






















































































Source:  Adjusted March 1980 CPS data tapes. 
"Full-year full-time workers work thirty-five or more hours per week for fifty weeks or more per year. 249  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
looking only at workers with health insurance and pension benefits, the 
ratio of  median female to median male fringe benefits, 58.0 percent, is 
now higher than their wages and salary ratio of 55.8 percent in table 6.3. 
This anomaly is explained by the fact that only 27.0 percent of all female 
workers received both health insurance and pension benefits as compared 
to 46.3 percent of males (table 6.3, final column). Thus female non-full- 
year non-full-time workers do less well than similar males, while fringe 
benefits reduce male-female compensation differentials for those females 
with both health insurance and pension benefits. Overall, blacks do not 
do quite as well as whites (table 6.2) when comparing median levels of 
benefits as a percentage of wages, but do slightly better than whites on 
this  same basis for workers with  both  health  insurance  and pension 
benefits.  It appears that much  of  the overall differences in  benefits 
between males and females (and to a lesser extent blacks and whites) can 
be explained by the existence of benefits in a given job as compared to 
differences in benefit levels for those workers of  each type with a given 
benefit package. 
Across all workers (table 6.2),  employers spend $1693 on supplements 
to wages  and salaries  (the difference  between  the employer  cost  of 
compensation and wages and salaries, not separately shown in tables 6.2 
and 6.3) which employees  then valued  at $2234 (employee value of 
compensation minus wages and salaries).  Excluding legally required 
benefits, these supplements were $725 and $953, respectively. Thus tax 
and scale advantages result in a difference in medians of  $541 between 
employee value and employer cost of  supplements including legally re- 
quired benefits and $228 excluding these benefits. Both differences were 
approximately 32.0 percent of employer cost. 
For workers with both health and pension benefits in table 6.3, the 
median level of supplements to salary including legally required benefits 
was $3603 in terms of  employer  cost  and $4884 at  employee value, 
producing a difference of $1281 or  35.6 percent of employer cost for these 
workers alone. Excluding legally required benefits, median insurance 
and deferred contributions alone were $2060 measured at employer cost 
and $3021 in employee value terms, leaving a difference of $961 or 46.5 
percent of employer cost. Clearly the differences between employer cost 
and employee value of  compensation are not insignificant at this time, 
particularly for workers who receive both health insurance and pension 
benefits. 
The aggregate difference between employer cost and employee value 
of  compensation was $67.43 billion or 7.71 percent of  total wages and 
salaries with almost 95 percent of  this difference due to the tax advan- 
tages of nonwage compensation alone. The aggregate gain in employee 
value due to tax advantages of $63.9 billion was 37.0 percent, as large as 
total supplements. Excluding legally required contributions, these differ- 250  Timothy M. Smeeding 
ences fall to $43.25 billion or 4.94 percent of aggregate salaries. Thus the 
employee advantages of excluding employer provided benefits from in- 
come taxation are quite large. In this day and age of  social security 
funding crises, it is interesting to note that if deferred contributions and 
insurance benefits were subject to payroll taxation by the employer, an 
additional $4.5 to $5.0 billion of social security payroll tax revenue would 
have been collected in 1979; double this amount if  these benefits were 
also subject to employee payroll taxation. 
While relative median compensation levels and measures of  benefits 
vary by only a small amount for a given measure of  compensation when 
comparing the groupings shown in tables 6.2 and 6.3, these estimates 
mask considerable differences across occupation groups, as seen in tables 
6.4  and 6.5.  In table 6.4,  median fringe benefits vary from $5345 for craft 
and kindred workers to $709 for service workers, measured at employee 
value. As a percentage of wages the differences ranged from 36.9 percent 
for nontransport operatives to 20.8 percent for service workers at em- 
ployee value and from 31.0 to 18.9 percent at employer cost. The most 
highly unionized occupations (e.g., craft and kindred workers and opera- 
tives) enjoyed the largest amount of  fringe benefits as a percentage of 
wages and salaries (confirming the results of Freeman and Medoff [1980] 
and Antos [1981]) along with professional, technical, and kindred work- 
ers. Restricting the universe to employees with both health insurance and 
pension  benefits  (table 6.5) considerably reduces this variance.  Now 
fringe benefits vary only from about 40 percent of  wages for sales or 
service workers to roughly 46 percent for managers and the highly union- 
ized groups when benefits are counted at employee value and from about 
32 to 37 percent of wages when valued at employer cost. Major differ- 
ences across occupations in table 6.4 are therefore explained largely by 
the fraction of each occupational group who receive both health insur- 
ance and pension benefits. The percent of all workers with both types of 
benefits is only 21.0 percent for service workers as compared to 51.4 
percent for managers and administrators. This explains why overall ser- 
vice workers’ fringe benefits of  $642 at employer cost rise to $2970 for 
those with both types of  benefits. 
In summary, tables 6.2 through 6.5 indicate a series of  interesting 
differences between the dollar level of different measures of compensa- 
tion and benefits for any given set of workers. As expected, both full-year 
full-time workers and workers with health insurance and pension cover- 
age benefit more than other groups in dollar terms and as a percentage of 
wages and salaries. Both male-female and interoccupational differences 
between  wages and salaries and other measures of  compensation are 
fairly substantial when measured across all workers. Tables 6.3 and 6.5 
show that these differences are more a matter of benefit recipiency status 
than of benefit levels per se. For instance females (or service workers) Table 6.4  Different Measures of Median Compensation by  Occupation in 1979 
Total Compensation 
without Legally 
Total Compensation  Required  Total Fringe Benefits 
Wages  Pay for 
and  Time  Employer  Employee  Employer  Employee  Employee  Employer 
Occupation  Salary  Worked  cost  Value  cost  Value  Value  cost 
Prof. /tech. 
& kind.  $14,327  $12,645  $16,895  $17,724  $15,523  $16,079  $5,079  $4,160 
Sales  6,393  5,826  7,278  7,545  6,639  6,718  1,719  1,452 
Clerical & 
kindred  7,539  6,753  8,945  9,496  8,152  8,354  2,653  2,192 
Craft & 
kindred  14,981  13,351  17,666  18,693  16,219  16,743  5,345  4,315 
Operating 
(ex.  trans.)  8,846  8,012  10,754  11,277  9,690  9,945  3,265  2,742 
Trandequip. 
oper.  12,188  11,212  14,774  15,581  13,486  13,845  4,367  3,562 
Mgr. & admin.  16,853  15,020  19,844  20,828  18,308  18,993  3,975  4,824 
Laborers  5,570  5,003  6,391  6,621  5,784  5,859  1,618  1,388 
Service  3,401  3,063  3,705  3,772  3,458  3,465  709  642 
Total  8,974  8,110  10,677  11,208  9,699  9,927  3,099  2,557 
Source:  Adjusted March 1980 CPS data tapes. Table 6.5  Different Measures of Median Compensation by Occupation for Workers 
with Both Health Insurance and Pension Coverage in 1979 
Wages 
and 
Occupation  Salary 
Prof.  /tech. 
& kind.  $18,900 
Mgr. & admin.  21,693 
Sales  15,976 
Clerical & 
kindred  11,188 
Craft & 
kindred  19,074 
Operating 
(ex. trans.)  13,050 
Tradequip. 
oper.  16,786 
Laborers  13,352 
Service  9,298 
Total  15,577 
Total Compensation 
without Legally  Percent of 
Total Compensation  Required  Total Fringe Benefits  All Workers 
Pay for  with Health 
Time  Employer  Employee  Employer  Employee  Employee  Employer  Insurance 
Worked  Cost  Value  cost  Value  Value  cost  and Pension 
$16,348  $22,544  $24,996  $21,080  $22,110  $8,646  $6,196  50.9% 
18,962  25,832  28,162  24,150  25,321  9,200  6,870  51.4 
14,249  19,355  20,616  17,796  18,817  6,367  5,106  22.5 
9,681  13,976  14,844  12,784  13,587  5,163  4,295  35.5 
16,919  23,029  25,209  21,246  22,355  8,290  6,110  50.7 
11,718  16,504  17,676  15,176  15,922  5,958  4,786  44.4 
15,166  20,588  21,979  19,113  20,010  6,813  5,422  45.4 
12,122  17,010  18,129  15,428  16,054  6,007  4,888  27.8 
8,356  11,326  12,115  10,469  10,848  3,759  2,970  12.0 
13,775  19,180  20,461  17,637  18,598  6,866  5,405  37.8 
Source:  Adjusted March 1980 CPS data tapes. 253  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
who are in jobs with both pension and health benefits receive levels of 
those benefits which are not dissimilar to males (or to those of  other 
occupations). The inequality problem is largely explained by  the rela- 
tively low fractions of  females and service workers who are in jobs with 
both types of  benefits. Additional tabulations not presented here indicate 
that the various measures of  total compensation examined above have 
little effect on age-earnings profiles or on regional differences in mea- 
sures of total compensation. 
6.5.2  Fringe Benefits and Compensation Inequality 
The second question we pose concerns itself with the impact of fringe 
benefits and supplements on the size distribution of  total earnings. To 
begin with, table 6.6 investigates the way in which the various measures 
of  total compensation are spread across wage and salary classes. All 
workers are ranked by wage level, and the percentage of workers in each 
bracket is shown. Mean levels of each additional measure of compensa- 
tion and mean levels of  benefits are then calculated, maintaining this 
same wage or salary ranking. These measures of mean compensation are 
recorded in part A of table 6.6, and as a percentage of wages and salaries 
by  income bracket in part B. Additional information is provided for 
full-year full-time workers and part-year part-time workers as well. Be- 
cause of  their disequalizing effect, benefits which are distributed in a 
largely prorich  pattern will  be  termed  regressive, while  those  which 
provide a larger fraction of  wages and salaries at low wage and salary 
levels will be referred to as progressive benefit structures. 
In table 6.6, pay for time worked declines as a percentage of earnings as 
wages rise, indicating that paid leisure (vacations and holidays) and other 
benefits included in salary increase with earnings. These percentages 
range from 97.0 percent of  salary in the lowest income class to 87.7 
percent for those with salary levels in excess of $50,000 a year. Part-year 
part-time  workers receive very little  in  the way of  these benefits as 
compared  to full-year full-time workers.  The employer cost of  total 
compensation, excluding legally required benefits, increases as a percent- 
age of salaries as earnings levels increase from 104.2  percent in the lowest 
bracket to 112.8 percent at the $20,000 level, declining above this point, 
while the employer cost of total compensation including legally required 
benefits follows the same pattern but rises by a much lesser amount, from 
116.0 to 121.6 percent of  salaries, peaking at roughly the same point. It 
appears that legally required benefits exert an equalizing influence on 
compensation, so much so that the employer cost of  compensation is 
actually a lesser percentage of salaries at levels of $50,001  or more than at 
earnings levels of  $2000 or less. 
Moving to employee value of compensation, we find that tax and scale 
advantages, which generally increase with earnings due to increasing Table 6.6  Mean Levels of Compensation and Fringe Benefits by  Wage or Salary Level in 1979 
Total Compensation 
Total  without Legally 
Compensation  Required  Total Fringe Benefits 
(Percent  Wages  Pay for 
Annual Wage  of  All  and  Time  Employer  Employee  Employer  Employee  Employee  Employer 
or Salary Level  Workers)  Salary  Worked  cost  Value  cost  Value  Value  cost 
A. Mean Compensation 
$2,000 or less 








50,001 or more 
All workers 


















































































































4,789  5,623  5,934  5,159  5,278  1,145  834 B. Mean Compensation as a Percentage of  Wages and Salary 
$2,000 or  less  (15.2)  100.0%  97.0%  116.0%  117.7%  104.2%  104.8%  20.7%  18.0% 
2,001-5,000  (15.3)  100.0  95.2  117.6  120.0  105.1  106.2  24.8  21.8 
5,001-7,500  (12.6)  100.0  92.9  119.8  124.9  107.9  110.1  32.0  26.9 
7,501-10,ooO  (11.0)  100.0  91.8  121.1  127.1  109.6  112.4  35.3  29.3 
10,001-15,000  (18.1)  100.0  90.5  121.1  128.2  110.9  114.7  37.7  30.6 
15,001-20,ooO  (12.6)  100.0  89.1  121.6  129.7  112.8  116.9  39.6  31.3 
20,001-25,ooO  (7.8)  100.0  89.1  119.6  131.1  112.1  118.7  42.0  32.5 
25,001-30 ,ooO  (3.8)  100.0  88.8  119.6  129.5  112.1  118.4  40.7  30.8 
30,001-50,ooO  (3.4)  100.0  88.1  116.5  127.6  110.9  118.5  39.5  28.4 
50,001 or more  (4  100.0  87.7  111.5  123.0  108.7  119.0  35.3  23.8 
All workers  (100.0)  100.0  90.1  120.3  128.0  110.7  115.7  38.1  30.6 
Full-year full- 
time workers  (56.2)  100.0  89.1  120.6  128.8  111.4  116.9  39.7  31.5 
Part-year part- 
time workers  (14.0)  100.0  98.9  116.4  122.5  106.5  109.0  23.6  17.2 
Source: Adjusted March 1980 CPS data tapes. 256  Timothy M.  Smeeding 
marginal tax rates, magnify these differentials below the $25,000 level. At 
higher levels of  earnings, tax and scale advantages increase the employee 
value of  supplements greatly, offsetting a large part of  the decline in 
employer cost of compensation due to  the earnings ceilings on most forms 
of  legally required benefits. These advantages are large enough that, 
excluding legally required benefits, the employee value of compensation 
generally increases as a percentage of  earnings throughout the earnings 
range. In comparison, employer cost excluding required benefits declines 
as a percent of  wages above the $20,000 level. As expected, full-year 
full-time workers receive larger benefits, as a percentage of salaries, than 
do part-year part-time employees. 
The final two columns of table 6.6 summarize these trends by present- 
ing fringe benefits measured at employer cost and at employee value. 
These figures clearly indicate a regressive distribution of fringe benefits. 
In general, the 43.1 percent of  workers at salary levels below $7500 
receive lesser amounts of benefits as a percentage of salary than do higher 
salary workers. Employer cost of fringe benefits peaks at 32.5 percent of 
wages in the $20,000- $25,000 range, falling by  a substantial amount 
above that level. In terms of employee value, we find a similar pattern 
with the 42.0 percent peak in this same earnings bracket. However, tax 
advantages again help maintain employee value at higher levels of wages 
and salaries. 
Finally, levels of fringe benefits among part-year part-time workers are 
substantially  below those for full-year full-time workers,  and for all 
workers combined. Whereas the employer cost of benefits for a full-year 
full-time worker averages 31.5 percent of wages and salaries, a part-year 
part-time employee receives benefits which average only 17.2 percent. 
The reasons for these patterns in benefits by earnings level are more 
apparent in table 6.7. Here  we have disaggregated fringes as a percentage 
of  wages and salaries by  component. The percentages  are formed by 
summing the component of  benefits over all workers and dividing by 
aggregate wages in each income bracket. In part A the components of 
benefits are measured for all workers at employer cost and in part B at 
employee value. Parts C and D present similar decompositions for full- 
year full-time workers and part-year part-time workers, respectively. 
In general, overall levels of benefits and their pattern by income class 
mask significantly different patterns  in the individual components of 
compensation. As expected, those components of  benefits already in- 
cluded in wages, i.e., vacations, holidays, and other payments (or pay for 
time not worked), in columns (1) and (2) are quite regressively distrib- 
uted, each of  them increasing consistently and substantially with earn- 
ings. These differences mirror the treatment of  part-time vs. full-time 
workers at the very bottom of table 6.7." These estimates are the same in 257  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
parts A and B of table 6.7 because tax and scale advantages do not apply 
in this case. 
The decomposition of  nonwage compensation in the form of  supple- 
ments to wages and salaries in columns (4) through (7) reveal several 
interesting  patterns.  Deferred  compensation  which  consists  almost 
wholly of pension contributions, increases greatly with earnings. Because 
pensions  are calculated  as  a constant percentage of  earnings for  all 
workers within each industry, this pattern is mainly due to the pattern of 
pension plan coverage reported on the CPS. Tax advantages and econo- 
mies of scale in pension fund management increase employee value (part 
B of table 6.7) by 45 percent relative to employer cost, further magnifying 
this pattern.  In column  (5) insurance contributions, of  which health 
insurance premiums are roughly 80 percent, are fairly proportionate to 
salaries running from 3.7 percent at the lowest earnings level to a peak of 
6.2 percent and then declining to 2.9 percent in the highest earnings 
group when measured at employer cost. Tax and scale advantages (part 
B) make these contributions slightly more regressive when counted at 
employee value. Taken together, insurance and deferred contributions 
(column [6]) generally rise with wages when measured at employer cost, 
and are quite regressive when counted at employee value, mirroring the 
patterns evident in table 6.6 
In sharp contrast to other elements of compensation, legally required 
benefits (column [7] in table 6.7) are progressively distributed for two 
reasons: First, because they benefit virtually all workers.  Second, be- 
cause employer contributions are a constant percentage of wages up to a 
ceiling earnings level. For instance, the maximum employer social secu- 
rity contribution in 1979 was $1405 at $22,900. Above this level the fixed 
contribution declines as a fraction of  wages. A similar but even more 
sharply progressive employer contribution schedule affects other legally 
required social insurance programs. Contribution ceilings for unemploy- 
ment insurance and workers’ compensation peak below $10,000. Because 
of  this pattern, legally required benefits have a leveling effect on total 
nonwage compensation, tending to cancel out the regressive distribution 
of nonlegally required supplements. At the very bottom of table 6.7 we 
find that legally required benefits are the only form of  compensation 
which provides a larger percent of wages for part-year part-time workers 
than for full-year full-time workers. The net effect (column [8]) reveals a 
slightly peaked distribution of total additions to wages when measured at 
employer cost. At employee value, tax and scale advantages reduce the 
decline in these estimates after their peak at the $25,000 level. 
Finally, column (9) combines supplements and pay for time not worked 
to arrive at a measure of  total fringe benefits. Because of  the steeply 
regressive distribution of pay for time not worked, overall fringe benefits Table 6.7  Components of Fringe Benefits as a Percentage of Wages and Salaries by Wage and Salary Level in 1979 
Fringe Benefits Included in 
Wages and Salaries  Supplement to Wages and Salaries 
Other  Vacation 
Pay-  and Holi- 
Deferred  Insurance 
Compen-  Compen- 
Required  Total 
Contri-  Total  Fringe 
Annual Wage  mentsa  day Pay  Total  sation  sation  Subtotal  butions  Supplements  Benefits 
and Salary  (1)  (2)  (3) =  (1) +  (2)  (4)  (5)  (6) =  (4) +  (5)  (7)  (8) =  (6) + (7)  (9) =  (3) +  (8) 
A. Benefits Measured at Employer Cost, All Workers 









50,001 or more 
Overall mean 
1.2%  1.7%  2.9% 
1.4  3.2  4.6 
1.9  5.1  7.0 
2.2  '  6.3  8.5 
2.3  7.0  9.3 
2.2  7.4  9.6 
2.2  8.3  10.5 
2.4  8.5  10.9 
2.5  9.1  11.6 
2.7  10.8  13.7 
2.2  7.4  9.6 
.4%  3.7% 
1.1  4.0 
2.3  5.6 
3.2  5.7 
4.8  6.2 
6.1  5.9 
7.1  5.6 
7.3  4.9 
7.0  3.9 
7.2  2.9 












11.8%  15.9% 
11.9  17.0 
11.9  19.8 
11.5  20.4 
10.2  21.2 
9.4  21.4 
8.8  21.5 
7.5  19.7 
5.6  16.5 
2.3  12.4 











29.4 B.  Benefits Measured at  Employee Value, All Workers 














































































































C. Full-Year Full-Time Only 
Employer cost  2.3  7.8  10.1  5.6  5.4  11.0  9.0  20.0  30.1 
Employee value  2.7  7.8  10.0  8.4  7.7  16.1  12.3  28.4  38.5 
D.  Part-Year Part-Time Only 
Employer cost  .9  0.0  .9  1.9  3.5  5.4  11.0  16.4  17.3 
Employee value  .9  0.0  .9  2.7  4.7  7.4  13.6  21.0  21.9 
Source: Adjusted March 1980 CPS data tapes. 
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are decidedly prorich, even in terms of  employer cost. Tax and scale 
advantages only strengthen this pattern in part B. For instance, benefit 
levels for the 30.5 percent of workers in the lowest two brackets are only 
slightly more than half as large, in percentage terms, as are benefit levels 
for the 15.8 percent of workers in the highest four brackets once tax and 
scale advantages are taken into account. 
Based on the results presented in tables 6.6  and 6.7,  one might suspect 
that conventional summary measures of the size distribution of employee 
compensation would tend toward greater inequality once fringe benefits 
were included. Table 6.8 confirms these suspicions. First, in part A of 
table 6.8  we find that the income share of  the bottom quintile falls from 
2.4  to 2.1  percent while the top quintile share increases from 47.3 to 48.4 
percent when moving from left to right. These movements are confirmed 
by a 3.1 percent increase in the Gini coefficient, from .4529 to .4667, 
between these measures of  compensation. In contrast, the size distribu- 
tion pay for time worked is more equal than the size distribution of wages 
and salaries because of  the fact that a much larger proportion of  wages 
takes the form of  vacation and holiday pay for higher income groups. 
Thus vacation and holiday pay exacerbates earned income inequality, as 
we would expect based on tables 6.6 and 6.7.  Altogether the Gini rises by 
4.5 percent or from .4466 to .4667, moving from pay for time worked- 
the most equally distributed measure of compensation-to  the employee 
value  of  total  compensation,  excluding required  benefits-the  least 
equally  distributed measure.  Including legally required  benefits only 
slightly tempers this conclusion. Similar patterns can be found for males 
and females. In part B of table 6.8  a similar pattern is evident for full-year 
full-time workers. Though size distributions of  compensation for full- 
year full-time workers are considerably more equal than for all workers, 
even larger differences between the size distributions of total compensa- 
tion can be noted. For males, the employee value Gini (excluding re- 
quired benefits) exceeds the  pay for time worked Gini by 6.1  percent, and 
for females by 9.5  percent (i.e., .2584  vs. .2359). In both parts of this table 
the distributional summary measures of the employer cost of compensa- 
tion differ little from wages. Thus it is mainly the tax and scale advantages 
captured in the employee value measures which produce these differ- 
ences. 
Based on these tabulations it is fair to conclude that more full measures 
of  compensation, such as those presented in this paper, indicate a more 
unequal size distribution of  total employee compensation than the dis- 
tribution of  wages and salaries alone. Moreover, if  we could include 
measures of  other job perks and noncash compensation normally en- 
joyed by high-wage professionals, managers, and administrators in our 
estimates (see note 6), we strongly suspect that an even more unequal 
distribution of compensation would result. The major equalizing compo- Table 6.8  The Size Distribution and Degree of  Inequality of Various Measures of Total Compensation in 1979 
(measures of annual compensation) 
Total Compensation 
Excluding Legally 
Total Compensation  Required Contributions 
Wages  Pay for 
and  Time 
Salaries  Worked  cost  Value  cost  Value 
Employer  Employee  Employer  Employee 
A. All Workers 
Quintile shares of  compensation: 
(Lowest) First quintile  2.4%  2.5%  2.2%  2.1%  2.2%  2.1% 
Middle quintiles  50.3  50.8  50.8  50.0  50.1  49.5 
(Highest) Fifth quintile  47.3  46.7  47.0  47.9  47.7  48.4 
Gini coefficients: 
All workers  ,4529  ,4466  ,4535  ,4626  ,4594  ,4667 
Males  ,4027  ,3944  ,3984  ,4081  ,4068  ,4144 
Females  ,4239  ,4189  .4336  ,4430  .4347  .4431 
B. Full-Year Full-Time Workers 
Quintile shares: 
(Lowest) First quintile  8.0%  8.1%  7.9%  7.6%  7.8%  1.4% 
Middle quintiles  53.2  53.7  54.0  53.5  53.4  53.1 
Gini coeflcients: 
All workers  ,3099  .3036  ,3043  ,3134  ,3128  ,3202 
Males  ,2852  .2679  ,2760  ,2858  ,2860  ,2939 
Females  ,2415  ,2359  ,2455  .2554  ,2490  .2584 
(Highest) Fifth quintile  38.0  38.2  38.1  38.9  38.8  39.5 
~  ~  ~~ 
Source: Adjusted March 1980 CPS data tapes. 
aFull-year, full-time workers work thirty-five or more hours per week for fifty weeks per year or more. 262  Timothy M. Smeeding 
nents of  fringe benefits in the private nonfarm labor market are legally 
required benefits which, some may argue, may have a fairly low value for 
persons on whose behalf such contributions are made. Finally, both the 
relatively low incidence of benefits and the low levels of benefits among 
part-year part-time workers appears to reduce the relative cost of  this 
type of employee. If employers tend to favor these types of employees for 
cost reasons, hiring and laying off part-time workers on a regular basis, 
some portion of  the recent pattern of  labor market instability in the 
United States may be attributable to the relatively low employer com- 
pensation cost for these workers. 
6.5.3  Measures of  Compensation and Regression Models 
The final issue to be investigated involves the question of  the biases 
involved in empirical labor market research which relies only on wages 
and salaries as a proxy for total compensation. If  regressors have widely 
different values for different measures of  total compensation, biases in 
the effect of, for instance, education on compensation levels will likely be 
present. In this section we present a basic human capital model of  the 
type suggested by  Mincer (1974) and Blinder (1973). The dependent 
variable  is  the log hourly  compensation  measure,  that is,  the given 
measure of compensation divided by total hours worked. The log-linear 
format allows for straightforward comparison across the categories of 
total compensation with each coefficient capturing the approximate per- 
centage change in the measure of  hourly compensation, given a unit 
change in the independent variable. In the case of dummy variables (all 
variables but experience and experience squared) the coefficients can be 
interpreted as the percentage change in the dependent variable due to a 
change in the variable in question.” Regression results are shown for all 
workers (table 6.9) and the 47.9 percent of  workers with both pension 
and health insurance benefits (table 6.10); standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Also included in the final column is the hourly fringe benefit 
rate at employee value (i.e., fringe benefits divided by hours worked). 
These final figures can  thus be  compared to the  other measures  of 
compensation. 
In general, the coefficients for virtually all independent variables (ex- 
cept for education) do not vary a great deal in either table 6.9 or 6.10. An 
extra year of “potential” experience (age minus years of education minus 
6) has about a 2 percent greater impact on fringe benefits than on wages 
or pay for time worked in table 6.9, but not in table 6.10. Similarly, 
female fringe benefits are about 40.5 percent less than male fringe ben- 
efits compared to a 35.4 percent difference in wages in table 6.9. But 
restricting the universe to workers with both pension and health insur- 
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about 36.4 percent less for females while wages are 41.4 percent less. 
Thus, if  workers with both pension and health insurance benefits are 
considered, fringe benefits reduce female labor market disadvantages. 
As noted earlier, labor market disadvantages in table 6.9 then reflect the 
fact that females are more likely to be in jobs which do not offer both 
types of  benefits. 
The most significant differences in these models deal with the impact of 
education and work status. In the case of education there are only small 
(2-3 percent) differences between the measures of total compensation in 
terms of  return  to higher  education levels. But comparing  these to 
benefits reveals large differences for all workers. For instance, in table 
6.9 some college (13-15  years of  education) increases wages by  19.7 
percent, but increases the employee value of  benefits by  roughly 32.4 
percent. Similarly college graduates earn about 45.0 percent more than 
high school graduates in wage and salary terms, but receive approxi- 
mately 59.6 percent more in fringe benefits in table 6.9.  These effects are 
not, however, apparent in table 6.10. For workers with health insurance 
and pension benefits, the impact of  fringe benefits is almost identical to 
the impact of education on the various measures of compensation. Thus 
again it appears that major differences in fringe benefits are due to the 
type of job which a worker has, i.e., their occupation and industry, which 
in turn affects their probability of  having health insurance or pension 
benefits. 
The coefficient for non-full-year full-time workers is interesting. For 
instance, in table 6.9, all else constant, on a pay-for-time-worked basis it 
appears that non-full-year full-time workers receive a higher rate of 
hourly compensation for actual hours worked than do full-year full-time 
workers.  In table  6.9, for all workers,  this difference averages  12.1 
percent with a small standard error. In table 6.10, for workers with health 
and pension benefits, the differences are only 2.0 percent with a high 
standard error.  l3 The final column in table 6.9 indicates that non-full-year 
full-time workers  receive 51.6 percent  less fringe benefits per  hour, 
compared  to  full-year  full-time workers.  Based  on  these  results,  it 
appears highly probable that hourly rates of  pay for non-full-year full- 
time workers compensate, to some extent, for their dearth of  benefits. 
For instance, on the March 1980 CPS, only 5.1 percent of  all part-year 
part-time workers received both health insurance and pension benefits as 
compared to 55.6 percent of  all full-year full-time workers. This com- 
pensation-wage effect for non-full-year full-time workers who receive 
some vacation and holiday pay may at least partially offset the conclusion 
that part-year part-time workers are relatively cheap labor, as suggested 
ea~1ier.I~  As expected, these differences are reduced to insignificance 
(table 6.10) once those workers with only health insurance and pension Table 6.9  Comparative Human Capital Regression Results for All Private Economy Nonfarm Workers in 1979 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable, Log of  Hourly 
Total Compensation 
Excluding 
Total Compensation  Legally Required 
Wages  Pay for 
and  Time  Employer  Employee  Employee  Employer 
Variable  Salary  Worked  cost  Value  Value  cost 
Constant  1.423  1.232  1.574  1.575  1.466  1.457 
Experience  .031  .029  ,032  ,034  .035  ,033 
(.015)  (.015)  (.015)  (.015)  (.015)  (.015) 
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.005)  (.ow  (.005) 
Experience*  -  ,001  -  ,001  -  .001  -  .001  -  .001  -  .001 
(.ow  (.ow  (.ow  (.ow  (.ow  (.ow 
(.008)  (.008)  (.ow  (.ow  (.007) 
Race  -  .086  -  .089  -  .082  ,086  -  .084  -  ,082 
Sex  -  ,354  -  ,358  -  .364  -  .367  -  .368  -  .364 
(.005)  (.005)  (.@J5)  (.005) 
Region  -  .084  -  ,082  -  ,085  ,087  -  ,089  -  .087 
Residence  -  ,098  -  ,093  -  .092  -  .096  -  .lo2  -  .099 
(.005)  (  ,005)  (.005)  (.Of351 




Value Education (years) 
Less than 7 
8-1 1 
13-15 





-  ,140 
(.016) 








-  .189 
(.007) 
.300 
-  ,147 
(.016) 










-  ,139 
(.016) 








-  .201 
(.006) 
.315 
-  .142 
(.017) 








-  ,213 
(.007) 
.325 
-  .150 
(.017) 








-  .225 
(.007) 
.330 
-  ,143 
(.017) 








-  ,212 
,323 
(.007) 
-  ,112 









-  .516 
(.009) 
,415 
Definitions  of Variables: 
Experience = age minus years of  education minus six. 
Race  = 1 if  black; 0 otherwise. 
Sex  = 1 if  female; 0 otherwise. 
Region  = 1 is South; 0 otherwise. 
Residence  = 1 is nonmetropolitan; 0 otherwise. 
Veteran status = 1 if  veteran; 0 otherwise. 
Non-full-year  non-full-time = 1  for all workers who did not work thirty-five or more hours per week and who also did not work fifty or  more weeks per year. 266  Timothy M. Smeeding 
Table 6.10  Regression Results for AIL  Private Economy Nonfarm Workers with 
Both Pension and Health Benefits (standard errors in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable, Log of  Hourly 
Total Compensation 
Excluding Legally 
Total Compensation  Required 
Wages  Pay for 
and  Time  Employer  Employee  Employee  Employer 
Variable  Salary  Worked  Cost  Value  Value  Cost 
Constant  1.775 
Experience  ,030 
(.031) 
(.001) 
Experience’  -  ,001 
(.OOO) 




Less than 7  -  ,096 
(.025) 
(.015) 
13-15  ,155 
(.015) 
16 or more  ,395 
(.016) 
Veteran status  .055 
Non-full-year 
Region  -  ,072 
Residence  -  .089 
Education (years) 
8-11  -  ,023 
(.008) 
(.001) 
full-time  -  ,054 




-  ,001 




(  ,007) 
( ,006) 
-  ,070 
-  .084 
-  ,093 
(  ,025) 














-  .001 






-  .066 
-  .081 
-  ,091 
(.023) 












(  ,030) 
,030 
-  ,001 




-  ,068 
(.007) 
-  ,084 
(.006) 









-  .028 






-  ,001 






-  .069 
-  .091 








(  .008) 
-  ,029 






-  ,001 
-  ,102 






-  .083 
-  ,100 








(  .008) 
-  .148 
(.011) 
,269 
Definition of  Variables: Same as table 6.9. 
benefits are included in the analysis. For this group, non-full-year full- 
time status only reduced fringe benefits by 14.8 percent as compared to 
full-year full-time employees. 
In conclusion, based on tables 6.9 and 6.10, it does not appear that the 
wage and salary measure of  total compensation, chosen for the most part 
by necessity in human capital studies, creates any significant bias in the 
results of  those studies. However, two notes of  caution must be added. 
First of all, the nondifferences in the coefficients  in these tables may be a 
reflection of the simulation methodology used to allocate fringe benefits 
to CPS workers. As with all simulations, our methodology compresses 267  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
the variance  in benefit levels below that which  would be obtained if 
individuals had reported actual benefit levels. But the Leibowitz paper in 
this volume, which is based on actual employer provided data for indi- 
vidual workers and not  on imputed benefit amounts, supports these 
results based on Leibowitz’s  interpretation of her coefficients. Still, while 
the impact of  education, experience, sex, etc., on chosen measures of 
compensation do not vary by a great deal, the same coefficients  for fringe 
benefits themselves do exhibit some substantial differences, for example, 
those with some college and for college graduates. Further, there does 
appear to  be  some substantial difference  between  full-year full-time 
workers and other workers which is partially compensated for by higher 
nominal market wage rates for hours actually worked for non-full-year 
full-time workers. 
Second, more complete specification of  such models, for example, a 
mod,el which  includes  occupation-  or industry-specific differences  in 
fringe benefits (the major differences which our simulation procedures 
directly controlled for), may  produce  differences in the effect of  the 
independent  variables  on  hourly  compensation  rates.  Moreover,  it 
appears that studies of  sexual differences in rates of  compensation may 
produce different coefficients, and possibly then different measures of 
the degree of labor market compensation differences between the sexes, 
than would studies based on wages and salaries alone. In both table 6.9 
and 6.10, 5 percent differentials between fringe benefits and salaries for 
men and women were noted with the differences running in opposite 
directions in the two tables. However, until formal studies of  this nature 
are actually completed, the extent of such biases-if  there really are such 
biases-remain  to be seen. 
6.6  Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has presented several measures of employee compensation, 
including measures of  the employer cost and employee value of  such 
benefits. A substantial differential between employer cost and full em- 
ployee value was noted for various groups of workers. We were not able 
to estimate employee preferences for various types of benefits and thus 
could not adjust for nonoptimal situations. To the extent that an em- 
ployee is forced to accept a benefit package with some components of that 
package valued below employer cost, the employee value measure used 
here may overstate the true employee value of compensation. Research 
on the determination of these preferences, for instance using studies of 
employer benefit package adjustments when employees are presented 
with a “cafeteria” plan, should be undertaken. 
In many ways, the results of  this endeavor seem promising, while in 
other ways they are disappointing. The regression results do not suggest 268  Timothy M. Smeeding 
that the different measures of  compensation used in these regressions 
would substantially affect the previously determined impact of various 
explanatory variables on hourly wages and salaries. To the extent that 
more detailed outside data on the distribution of various types of benefits 
across different groups of workers become available, more sophisticated 
and accurate benefit simulation models may produce different results. 
While at this time we are not optimistic, we are working on new data 
sources which will improve the quality of  these estimates. 
On the other hand, several interesting patterns of benefit distribution 
across different demographic groups (male-female) and different income 
classes were noted. It appears that, as we have measured them, fringe 
benefits increase earned income inequality with this difference mainly 
due to the substantial tax and scale economy advantages of  employer 
provided fringe benefits. 
Appendix 
Construction of  March 1980 CPS Data Base 
The March 1980 CPS contains wage and salary income data for a large 
group of  U.S. workers. For the first time, the March CPS  also asked 
workers about employer  or union  pension plan  coverage and health 
insurance coverage. Respondents indicated whether the employer had a 
pension or health insurance plan, whether or not they were covered by 
their employer’s plan, whether the employer subsidized the health insur- 
ance plan if they were covered, and whether they had individual or family 
coverage. No other information concerning nonwage compensation was 
obtained. The BLS 1977 EEEC survey and 1977 ECI survey both col- 
lected establishment data on employer outlays for various types of fringe 
benefits according to industry (EEEC) and occupation (ECI). The 1977 
EEEC data tapes were combined into fifty-three industry groups, and 
aggregate outlays for various types of  benefits as a percentage of WSAL 
were tabulated (see table 6.1). These tabulations provide the basic value 
of  benefit data which was assigned to CPS workers. The ECI data were 
used  in  two ways:  first, to update fringe benefit values to 1979, and 
second, after the EEEC based imputation, as a check against the occupa- 
tion-specific consistency of  the imputed CPS benefit value data. 
In assigning benefit values to each individual worker, several different 
microsimulation techniques were employed. This appendix contains an 
explanation of the simulation methodology used to estimate the various 
components of the six measures of total compensation developed for this 
paper. We begin with definitions of  each measure and then proceed to 
explain how each variable was created. The numbers in parentheses 269  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
preceding each definition correspond to the equations which described 
these variables in the paper. Each mnemonic variable is explained below. 
WSAL = WSAL. 
PTW = WSAL -  OP -  VHOL. 
OP = SKSAL + BOSAL + SEV PAY. 
VHOL = VAC + HOL. 
C(TC) = WSAL + DC + IC + LR. 
DC = PERT + SVTHR. 
IC = LI + S/AI + HI. 
LR = SSRR + OR. 
V(TC) = WSAL + DC(t + 5’1)  + IC(t + S,)  + LR(t). 
V(TC)X= V(TC) -  LR(t). 
C(TC)X = C(TC) -  LR. 
WSAL = CPS wages and salaries, all private nonfarm workers. WSAL 
was $874.066 billion in 1979. 
PTW = pay for time worked, derived by subtracting VHOL and OP 
from WSAL. It includes straight time, wages, overtime pay, and shift 
differentials. PTW was $790.370 billion in 1979. 
OP = other nonPTW and non VHOL payments included in WSAL. 
These include: 
SKSAL = sick pay. Workers were randomly assigned sick pay re- 
cipiency based on industry-specific probabilities of  being covered as 
derived  from  the  Battelle  Employment  Related  Health  Benefits 
(ERHB)  Survey (Malhotra et al. 1980). Sick pay was then treated as an 
insurance policy, with an equal proportion of earnings assigned to each 
participant within each of the fifty-three EEEC industry groupings for 
which separate dollar amounts were available. Altogether SKSAL was 
.95 percent of  WSAL or $8.628 billion in 1979. 
BOSAL = nonproduction bonus.  Distributed across all non-part- 
year part-time workers by industry group in proportion to their wage 
and salary level. 
SEV PAY = severance pay and contributions to severance pay funds 
not realized in 1979. These were distributed across all full-time workers 
in proportion to their wage and salary level within each of  the fifty- 
three EEEC  industry groups. The decision to exclude part-time work- 
ers was based on the AWS and LOB surveys and discussions with the 
BLS officials who take these surveys. 
Together BOSAL and SEV PAY totaled $10.740 billion in 1979, 
which when combined with SKSAL produces a total value of $19.368 
billion for OP in 1979. 
VHOL = vacation and holiday pay. VHOL was estimated by assigning 
numbers of  weeks of  vacation  (and numbers of  holidays) to workers 
based on their industry, occupation, and firm-specific experience level. 
While firm-specific tenure data were not available in the March 1980 270  Timothy M. Smeeding 
CPS, they were available on an earlier May 1979 CPS special supplement. 
Months of  experience were assigned March 1980 CPS workers with a 
given level of tenure based on a regression model for estimating experi- 
ence similar to that employed by Corcoran and Duncan (1979) and van 
der Gaag, Haveman, and Smeeding (1980). Separate estimates were 
obtained from the May 1979 CPS for males and females further separated 
by full-time or part-time work status. Having assigned a level of experi- 
ence to March 1980 CPS workers, we next employed two BLS surveys: 
the  1977 Area Wage Survey (AWS) and the  1979 Level of  Benefits 
(LOB) survey to determine how vacations and holidays were divided 
among specific types of workers according to experience, industry, and 
occupation. Using these data, a certain number of  vacation days and a 
certain number of  holidays were assigned to CPS workers with a given 
level of  tenure. Using information  on  hours and weeks worked,  all 
full-year workers, and all full-time but part-year workers were given a 
value for vacation and holiday pay based on their average hourly wages 
and salaries as reported on the CPS and prorated for employees working 
less than full year (fifty weeks) or working less than full time (thirty-five 
hours per week). Part-year part-time workers were not assigned these 
benefits. Once thzse values were determined, employees were aggre- 
gated into the fifty-three industry groupings consistent with EEEC, and 
the percentage of aggregate wages and salaries assigned to CPS workers 
was checked  against industrywide totals (adjusted from  1977 to 1979 
using the ECI), and scaled up or down by  the same fraction for each 
worker in an industry grouping to reach the correct level of  aggregate 
vacation and holiday benefits in each industry grouping. Altogether the 
March 1980 CPS includes $64.329 billion in VHOL for 1979. 
C(TC) = employer cost of  compensation, and includes DC, IC, and 
LR: 
DC = deferred compensation which includes pensions and retire- 
ment pay (PERT) and employer savings or thrift plan contributions 
(SVTHR). PERT makes up in excess of  96 percent of  DC. Equal 
percentage amounts of  DC were assigned to workers reporting (or 
assigned) pension coverage on the March 1980 CPS. Dollar aggregates 
for determining these pensions were taken from the fifty-three indus- 
try-specific EEEC groupings for 1977, scaled up to 1979 by the change 
in PERT  noted in the ECI. No acceptable alternative to this admittedly 
crude pension benefit assignment technique is currently available. For 
this reason it is not possible to use this data set and regression tech- 
nique to estimate wage-pension trade-offs (as in Schiller and Weiss 
1980). Other data which provide a more detailed breakdown of  pen- 
sion benefit information (e.g., data from the President’s Commission 
on Pension  Policy)  are not  available at  this time.  Altogether  DC 
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IC = insurance  compensation which includes life insurance  (LI), 
sickness or accident insurance (S/AI), and health insurance (HI). Each 
type of  payment was imputed by  a complicated procedure which can 
only be  outlined here.  First,  the EEEC data  do not  separate  the 
components of IC, recording all insurance payments in one lump sum 
amount. Fortunately the 1977 ECI survey does separate these amounts 
by  industry.  These percentage breakdowns were used to divide the 
fifty-three EEEC industry groupings’ estimates of  IC into LI, S/AI, 
and HI. On average, 77 percent of  IC is HI, 12 percent is LI, and 11 
percent S/AI. But there are wide variances across industry groups. 
In the case of HI, average weekly premiums were assigned to work- 
ers reporting employer subsidized HI on the March 1980 CPS, accord- 
ing to family or individual coverage status. Premium amounts were 
obtained from the ERHB. These benefit amounts varied by  industry 
and occupation grouping, by family/individual coverage, by employer 
percentage of premium paid, and by total premium cost of the policy. 
Using this data, average premiums per employee for each type of plan 
(family or individual) were obtained along with the variance in em- 
ployer-employee  contributions  and  benefit  levels  within  industry 
groups. These premium values were updated to 1979 using Health 
Insurance Association of  America data and were distributed to pre- 
serve the intraindustry and intraoccupation benefit level differences 
noted in the ERHB. Next, workers whose employer paid all or part of 
the HI premium  were  estimated by  occupation  and industry. The 
employer percentage of premium paid was then either 100 percent or 
something less-depending  on the type of  coverage and industry as 
determined by  the ERHB and the March 1980 CPS. Workers were 
then assigned a net employer contribution based on coverage status 
and number of weeks worked. Dollar amounts were again aggregated 
and scaled on an equal dollar per worker basis and again prorated for 
weeks worked, to meet EEEC industry-specific total dollar amounts, 
adjusted to 1979 using the ECI. 
The Battelle ERHB Survey also contained information on the per- 
centage of employees in various industries who benefited from life and 
sicknesdaccident insurance, paid sick leave, or none of these, divided 
into establishments with group health insurance plans and establish- 
ments without them. LI and S/AI were calculated by assigning cover- 
age according to industry group specific probabilities estimated for 
those workers with and without  health  insurance according to the 
ERHB Survey.  Once a worker  was selected, LI was estimated by 
giving each covered worker the same percentage of salary in insurance 
protection, the percent determined by the ECI-adjusted EEEC total 
value of contribution divided by covered workers’ total wages within an 
industry. S/AI  was also estimated by assigning ERHB-based probabili- 272  Timothy M. Smeeding 
ties to determine coverage. However, equal weekly amounts of  S/AI 
were calculated for workers in each EEEC industry group according to 
weeks  worked,  and average  S/AI expenditures per  week worked. 
Altogether IC totaled $46.355 billion in 1981. 
LR = legally required contributions which consist of  social security 
and railroad retirement contributions (SSRR) and other required con- 
tributions (OR)  for workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, 
and other minor  legally required  payments.  SSRR was calculated 
simply as .0613 percent of wages up to a maximum of $1405 at $22,900. 
Other payments were calculated by  dividing EEEC industry-specific 
OR iota1 amounts (adjusted to 1979) by total wages and salaries of all 
workers up to $10,000 per year per worker (the most common unem- 
ployment insurance payroll tax base) within that group. This same 
percent was applied to wages (up to $10,000) and assigned to OR  for all 
workers within an industry. In total, $79.347 billion of  LR was esti- 
mated for 1979. 
Once all benefits were assigned, CPS amounts were aggregated accord- 
ing to occupation, region, or location and tabulated as a percentage of 
wages and salaries so that they were comparable to the ECI data. In all 
cases the resulting percentages either were identical to the ECI to three 
places after the decimal, or were within the range of  error which sepa- 
rates the EEEC  and ECI survey results to three places after the decimal. 
In summary then, DC, IC, and LR added $172.961 billion to WSAL 
($874.066 billion) producing an aggregate C(TC) of  $1047.027 billion 
including LR, and $967.680 billion for C(TC)Xexcluding LR. V(TC) and 
V(TC)X involve the same  compensation  components at  C(TC)  and 
C(TC)X, but also involve t,  S1  (for DC), and S2 (for IC): 
t = one over one minus the marginal federal personal income tax rate. 
The CPS does not contain income tax information. However, following 
the income tax simulation model used by  Mathematica  (Doyle et al. 
1980) and by  Smeeding (1975), the Census Bureau has designed a tax 
simulation model by  which CPS workers were grouped into tax filing 
units, assigned standard or itemized deduction status, and placed in a 
marginal federal personal income tax bracket. 
S, = scale factor for pension plans. Pension plans enjoy economies of 
scale based on the size of the pension fund. While custodial (administra- 
tive overhead) fees decline by a small amount when comparing an Indi- 
vidual Retirement Account (IRA) or a Keough plan (for self-employed 
persons) to larger pension funds, the major economies are due to lower 
securities commissions for portfolio  adjustments.  As shown in table 
6.A.  1,  custodial fees and securities commissions  fall from 5.90percent for 
an IRA (Keough) plan to 3.54 percent for large pension funds, yielding a 
maximum value of  2.36 percentage points for S1  (Mahler and Hanson 
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Table 6.A.1  Scale Factor for Pension and Retirement Plans: S1 
Category 
of  Aggregate 
Pension 
Plan Size" 
Total Custodial and 
Securities Fees as a 
Percent of  Aggregate 
Pension Value  S: 
IRAiKeough  5.90%  NA% 
Small  4.43  1.47 
Medium  4.13  1.77 
Large  3.54  2.36 
Source:  Paul Mahler and William Hanson; Merrill,  Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith 
Pension Fund Managers. 
"Exact dollar  values for determining  small,  medium,  and large pension  plans are not 
disclosed, as requested by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc. 
bS1  factors  are calculated  by  subtracting  the fee for given sue pension  plan  from the 
IRA/Keough figure of  5.90 percent. 
outlays divided by  the total number of  firms for each of  nine industry 
groupings. Covered employees in each industry grouping received the S1 
factor for that grouping. 
S2 = scale and group rating factor for insurance contributions. Com- 
mercial employer group health insurance is significantly less expensive 
than individual coverage due to  lower sales costs (economies of scale) and 
group rating advantages. The difference in total expenses as a percentage 
of total premium for commercial health insurance companies varies from 
38.7 to 61.6 percent of premium for groups of one to three employees, to 
levels of 6.0 to 7.0 percent for employee groups of one thousand or more 
workers (Thexton 1978; Schuttinga 1981). However, these differences 
are much smaller for Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS) health plans where 
expenses run only from 12.0 percent for groups of one to three workers to 
7.1 percent for groups of  one thousand or more workers (Schuttinga 
1981). Various factors account for these differences, including the non- 
profit status of  BC/BS and the fact that BC/BS cross-subsidizes small 
group plans at the expense of  larger group plans. In any case, because 
individual BC/BS plans are available at lower rates than commercial 
policies, the lower BC/BS expense margins were assumed to capture the 
current differential savings between individual and group policies. These 
factors are shown in table 6.A.2 and were used to adjust medical, sickness 
or accident, and life insurance for economies of  scale and group rating. 
Group size was estimated by the average number of covered workers per 
firm within a given industry group. 
While these simulation methods have most certainly compressed the 
true variance in employer contributions, particularly for pension plans, 
we expect that the benefit imputation procedures were of  a sufficiently 
sophisticated nature to capture a large fraction of  the true variance in 274  Timothy M. Smeeding 
Table 6.A.2  Scale Factors for Insurance Plans: Sz 
Total Expenses" 
as a Percent of 
Group Size  BCIBS Premium  Sb, 
1-3  12.0%  NA% 
4-9  11.0  1.0 
10-19  10.3  1.7 
20-49  9.2  2.8 
50-100  8.5  3.5 
100-249  8.0  4.0 
25W99  7.6  4.4 
500-999  7.4  4.6 
1,000-4,999  7.1  4.9 
5,000 or more  7.0  5.0 
Source:  James Schuttinga, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Estimates are 
for August 1, 1978. 
"Total expenses include premium taxes, sales costs, claims processing costs, and other costs. 
bSz  is calculated by  taking the difference between expenses for groups of  1-3,  i.e.,  12.0 
percent,  and the expense level in each group size bracket. 
employer contributions for fringe benefits. More refined estimates of the 
value and distribution of benefits and greater variance in imputed benefits 
await the availability of  new and more detailed data sources. 
Notes 
1. There are, however,  recent  surveys which provide at least some of  the necessary 
information for a limited group of  workers, e.g., the 1977 National Medical Care Expendi- 
ture Survey which will soon be available for public use. 
2.  Others (e.g., Antos 1981; Alpert 1980) have followed the opposite approach, aggre- 
gating CPS variables and using these aggregates in conjunction with BLS data to analyze 
components of  total compensation on an establishment basis. 
3.  While fringe benefits are defined and were simulated in hourly wage terms, they can 
also be aggregated  across all workers  (as in table 6.1) or  expressed in terms of  annual 
earnings (as in section 6.5). One problem with breaking fringe benefits into hourly rates is 
the definition  of  hour-ither  hours  actually worked, or hours worked plus vacation, 
holiday, and other hours paid for but not worked, could be used. In this paper we use the 
latter (Census) definition of  hours. 
4.  With  deferred compensation,  an employee only postpones  taxation.  However, in 
most cases (pensions, for instance) taxes are lowered as well as deferred by postponing 
taxation of  benefits until retirement. In  addition to deferral of  taxation,  a nonaccretion 
based income tax also allows deferred taxes to add to the aggregate value of  pension funds, 
producing a higher compound return to such investments as well. 
5.  These figures on pension coverage and the health insurance coverage questions which 
follow were  taken directly from the March  1980 CPS.  The 44.6 percent  of  all private 
nonfarm workers with pension coverage in 1979  exceeds the 43.7 percent of private nonfarm 
workers covered by pensions as reported in the May 1979 CPS (Beller 1981). 275  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
6.  Clotfelter  (1979) cited a recent  survey which indicated that 53 percent  of  sample 
companies paid for country club memberships for some executives, 83 percent for physical 
examinations, and 25 percent for personal use of  company planes. The survey showed that 
an executive earning $l0O,OOO averaged $30,000 in these and other types of  in-kind com- 
pensation. While it is often difficult to separate true “business” expenses (real costs of doing 
business)  from pure “pleasure”  (pure consumption and thus income or compensation) 
when dealing with travel and entertainment expenses and other perks, a strong argument 
can be made to include large proportions of  these outlays in a more full measure of  total 
employee compensation  (Clotfelter  1981). 
7.  Leisure refers to hours not worked and not paid for by the employer. Paid time off 
from work for vacations and holidays is included in fringe benefits, while time used for home 
production  is either ignored or, equivalently for our purposes, lumped with L. 
8.  In a similar fashion,  Thaler and Rosen (1975), Antos and Rosen (1975), Quinn 
(1979), and Smith (1979) have examined the trade-off between Wand A, ignoring B and L. 
Antos (1981) and Alpert (1980) examine the trade-off between Wand B, ignoring L  and A. 
Brown (1980) has added A, but not L,  to B and Win his analysis of equalizing differences in 
the labor market. Atrostic (1982) has included all four elements in an analysis of  labor 
supply behavior,  though A and B are combined into one subjective measure. 
9.  Others (e.g., Leibowitz in this volume; Woodbury 1981) have chosen to express this 
relationship in terms of  after-tax wages. Such a transformation  can be accomplished by 
multiplying both sides of equation (3) by (1 -  t,,,).  However, for the purposes of this paper, 
i.e., for comparing employee value to employer cost, we chose to cast the analysis in terms 
of  pretax wages to capture the fact that employees value nontaxed benefits in excess of their 
employer cost. In either case, the dollar value of  fringe benefits is the same regardless of 
whether the analysis is presented in terms of  pretax or after-tax wages. 
10.  Clearly, state specific marginal income tax rates should be included where appli- 
cable.  Thus our t  is really  a lower  bound estimate of  the  tax  advantages afforded  by 
nontaxable fringe benefits. Note that federal OASDHI payroll taxes do not apply in this 
case. Essentially, adding legally required employer contributions to employee wages and 
salaries indicates that we are treating social security as a form of deferred compensation, 
albeit possibly indirect and uncertain compensation,  not as a “tax” per se. 
11. In some ways these estimates of  zero vacation and holiday pay in part D of  table 6.7 
are only a direct consequence of  our decision not to allocate vacation and holiday pay to 
part-year  part-time  workers.  But, according to the best available information,  the vast 
majority of  such workers do not benefit from paid holidays or paid vacations. 
12. The coefficients of  a log-linear regression are only rough approximations of  percent- 
age increases for coefficients larger than .lo. However, in order to provide easy translation 
from the regression results to  the text, we refer to these coefficients as being roughly equal to 
percentage changes. 
13. This coefficient was statistically insignificant at the 95 percent level. 
14. However non-full-year  full-time workers in the regression  model would  include 
full-year part-time and part-year full-time workers who were allocated some vacation and 
holiday pay, as well as part-year part-time workers, who were not assigned these benefits. 
Pay for time worked differs from nominal wages for part-year part-time workers by only .9 
percent  (table 6.7). The other two  groups  of  non-full-year  full-time  employees  were 
allocated these benefits. Of the 41.8 million non-full-year full-time employees in 1979, only 
31.7 percent  (13.3 million) were part-year part-time  workers. On the other hand, only 
part-year part-time workers were singled out in tables 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8. 276  Timothy M. Smeeding 
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Comment  Martin David 
I will focus my comments on four areas: the conceptual underpinnings for 
the measurement of  total compensation, the simulation methodology, 
the value of the statistics presented, and the possibilities for improved 
data in future studies. 
Conceptual Underpinnings 
Smeeding’s estimates recognize that measures of  cash wages are no 
longer sufficient as a description of the compensation package received 
by  employees (if  they  ever were).  The estimates attempt to draw a 
distinction between employer cost and employee valuation. In criticizing 
Smeeding’s efforts, I will argue that several conceptual gaps mar the 
distinction drawn and imply that superior estimates can be drawn from 
the data base at hand. 
In presenting a utility function, Smeeding rightly points out that ameni- 
ties and leisure serve as important arguments. Indeed, it is probably more 
accurate to think of  equation  (1) as an indirect  utility function  and 
observe that there is a maximum achievable utility for any given vector of 
wage rates, fringe benefits, and amenities offered by the employers to 
whom an individual worker has access. Focusing on this indirect utility 
function, one can observe that there are two measures of  interest: 
A.  What is the utility gain associated with acceptance of employment 
on the terms offered? 
B.  What are the characteristics of the compensation vector (WG, FB, 
A)  that are  operative at  the several margins affecting work effort? That is, 
the decision on work intensity (hourdper week), the decision on work 
experience (hourdyear), and the decision as to length of working lifetime 
depend on current and expected future compensation vectors. 
To answer question A, it is clear that amenities of the job cannot be 
ignored. The disutility of work depends heavily on a number of  factors 
that contribute substantially to the well-being of the worker. In addition 
to the in-kind consumption benefits that Smeeding alludes to, workers 
benefit  from  employer  investments  in job safety, from  control over 
working  conditions and job planning,  and  employer  investments  in 
general training. The theory of  compensating differentials makes clear 
that variation in amenities will induce corresponding inverse variations in 
cash wage payments. Sider (1980) offers an excellent analysis that dem- 
onstrates the existence of  a frontier relating wages to job safety levels. 
Stafford and Duncan (1980) point to substantial consumptive uses of time 
during working hours that again lead to amenity values. To provide a 
meaningful measure of the utility gain (question A) one must either 
demonstrate that there is no correlation between amenities and other 
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forms of  compensation or one must control on the level of  amenity 
provided. 
Thus it appears that the employee valuation of  total compensation 
presented by Smeeding is at best a partial measure whose meaning is 
rendered ambiguous by the possibilities of compensating variations for 
some amenities and complementarities between cash and other forms of 
compensation in other cases. 
The second question has been almost completely ignored in Smeed- 
ing’s presentation. Table 6.10 gives a partial insight; the last row relates 
the effect of full-year, full-time status to the compensation package. This 
contrast should be elaborated to show the effect of weeks worked during 
the year and the effect of  employees with hours of  work in excess of 
normal working weeks, as opposed to those with temporary reductions in 
workhours or  layoffs. If  the fringe benefits prove to be a largely inframar- 
ginal form of compensation, we would have some important evidence on 
how the change in total compensation packages affects work incentives. 
A third question that can be asked about employment is a question that 
is asked by the employer: 
C. What is the resource cost of an additional employee? or additional 
employee hours? A question corresponding to the utility gain question 
for the individual is the social question: 
D. What is the total resource cost of  employment? 
Clearly, both of  these questions entail the resource  costs that  are 
encumbered by employers in creating amenities as well as cash com- 
pensation.  I see no way of  excluding such costs from consideration. 
Indeed, one might divide all resource costs of  employment into four 
categories: 
Provider  Costs Generating  Costs Complementary to 
Consumption Goods 
for the Employee 
Labor Services Provided in 
the Work Setting 
Employer  1  3 
3rd Party  2  4 
It is clear that the employer provided goods in category 1  can be either 
cash or in-kind; the distinction of  who is the provider may have little 
economic meaning. Some employers may choose to absorb the costs of a 
sick leave policy directly; others may prefer to negotiate and purchase a 
temporary disability insurance policy; mixtures of  these extremes are 
common. 
The point to be made is that the exclusion of costs under category 3 
(provision of uniforms, safety devices, or subsidizing  meals taken during 
working hours) excludes a significant and amenity-producing use of  re- 
sources. As a result it is not possible to relate the total compensation 
estimates in this paper to meaningful measures of costs of employment. 280  Timothy M. Smeeding 
Conceptually, Smeeding appears to have presented us with half a loaf. 
While half may be better than none, it seems that we should be extremely 
cautious about inferring either welfare or  resource cost implications from 
the data at hand. 
The tax  rate margin. The principal source of  difference between  the 
employee and employer valuation of fringe benefits is the margin created 
by  the assignment  of  a  marginal tax  rate to the wages and salaries 
reported (WSAL). The rate is used to inflate the imputed fringe benefits, 
according to 1/(1 -  tm).  This procedure is wrong for at least two reasons. 
The increase in utility associated with total compensation is the value of 
goods and services that both cash and in-kind compensation provide for 
consumption. If  the tax rate rises, the utility value of fringe benefits does 
not necessarily rise-the  health insurance benefit continues to provide 
the same increment in health. Rather, what has happened is that the 
after-tax value of  cash compensation falls as the tax rate rises. Thus the 
appropriate measure of  V(TC) would include WAGSAL net of  income 
and payroll taxes plus the full outlay for fringe benefits without adjust- 
ment (see figs. C6.1 and C6.2). 
The implications are twofold. First, for any wage earner V(TC) S 
C(TC), depending on the excess of scale economies in the purchase of 
fringe benefits over the employee tax liabilities. Second, it is the cumula- 
tive effect of  all tax brackets that determines the difference between 
disposable wage goods and wage goods paid by the employer. Thus the 
average tax rate determines the position of  the employee’s budget con- 
straint relative to the employer’s isocost level. This latter observation 
implies that the margin between V(TC) and C(TC) augmented by  the 
scale economies will be considerably less than Smeeding has estimated. 
A third aspect of  the adjustment for taxes paid is fundamental to the 
meaning of the V(TC). If a fixed revenue requirement for government is 
assumed, it is not possible for all employers to increase fringe benefits 
relative to wages without an increase in the tax rates; the converse holds if 
all employers reduce fringe benefits relative to wages. This observation 
suggests that the budget constraint on which Smeeding bases his valua- 
tions can not hold in the aggregate. In the long run, it is likely that 
Smeeding’s representative employee faces a budget constraint in which 
the difference between gross wages and purchasing power disposable for 
the purchase of  goods and services remains constant, no matter what 
arrangements  employers  make  for  the  provision  of  in-kind  fringe 
benefits. 
If  this latter argument has validity, it suggests that tax considerations 
do not increase the consumption attainable by  “typical” workers who 
trade wages for fringe benefits. For the typical worker the sole value of 





Fig. C6.1  AC = employer cost in the absence of  scale advantages;  A'C 
= after-tax  budget constraint;  W = cash income tradable to all 
commodities; B = in-kind income; ko,  kl,  k2 = bracket steps 
in federal income and payroll taxes including earned income 
tax credit. 
of  course, the existence of  tax-exempt status for some fringe benefit 
payments may alter the progressiveness of  the tax structure; increased 
use of fringe benefits by high-wage workers may cause tax rate changes 
for low-wage workers that leave them worse off. 
Fortunately use of  WSAL net of taxes plus employer costs provides the 
correct index of changes in worker utility over time as  changes in tax rates 
will automatically be accounted for in the relevant way. 
Simulation Methodology 
The procedures used by Smeeding are similar to what many others 
have done to create synthetic data sets. The assumptions are neither 
more unreasonable nor is the execution less questionable than the work 
of  others in creating CPS-IRS data sets or data sets that are used  to 
estimate the scope of  the welfare-eligible population.  As a scientific 
profession, we must be extremely critical of all of  these efforts on three 
grounds: (1) No measures of  the variance associated with the imputation 
procedures are created; (2) the use of  expectations reduces variance in 282  Timothy M. Smeeding 
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Fig. C6.2  AG = range of  economies of scale in fringe benefit provision; 
Hko = “zero” tax bracket; kokl = first tax bracket; klk2 = 
second tax bracket. 
the synthetic data set; and (3) the results are presented without informa- 
tion on the consequences of  alternative imputation rules. Rubin (1980) 
gives us guidance on how each of these three objectives can be achieved 
by multiple imputation. How would this apply to the statistics at hand? 
Smeeding’s imputations are imputations at two levels. In some cases, a 
personal characteristic that is related to the payment of fringe benefits is 
missing from the CPS data base. In other cases, the value of  a fringe 
benefit paid to an individual is not available, though information on some 
conditioning characteristics, including receipt of the benefit and occupa- 
tion and industry, are known. In the latter case the imputation may be 
described as the creation of  an index based on personal characteristics 
which is normalized to unity and then used to allocate the industrywide 
control on the aggregate of  fringe benefits paid in that industry. (I hope 
this characterization is not too gross). The important element of variance 
that is suppressed by this procedure is the variance in the ratio of fringe 
benefits to wage and salary payments that exists among firms within an 
industry.  This  variance  is  estimable from  the  EEEC. To preserve 
variance, a value of  the ratio would need to be drawn from the EEEC 
distribution and assigned to an appropriate number of  employees; this 
would imply different levels of fringe benefits for persons with the same 
conditioning characteristics within an industry. 283  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
Let me elaborate. Health insurance varies substantially across em- 
ployers with regard to types of services and costs that are reimbursable. 
Aside from the difference in proportion of premiums that are paid for by 
the employer, the amount of that premium will vary across firms. While 
Smeeding maintains variance in employer proportion contributed within 
an industry, as I understand the procedure, the same expected premium 
is used for all employers. This eliminated an important source of  var- 
iance. 
Failure to preserve the variance of  the fringe benefit payments that 
exists in the universe renders Smeeding’s conclusions on the Gini coef- 
ficient highly questionable. It also does violence to the regression findings 
since we can be sure that the covariance of personal characteristics with 
levels of fringe benefit payments is incorrect. This might not be so bad if 
we were sure that we understood the direction of bias in the covariance. 
However, as we have already suggested, one group of  workers chooses 
among compensating differential cash payments; for them we expect an 
inverse relationship between cash and fringe benefits. For others in the 
population, as Smeeding strongly suggests, tax considerations imply a 
positive correlation between compensation in cash and fringe benefits. 
No prior grounds exist for asserting the population value of  the covar- 
iance, and systematic understatement of  the random variation in fringe 
benefits produces a meaningless result. 
This same argument applies to the assignment of personal characteris- 
tics from other data sets to give the conditioning information  that is 
required for the imputation. 
Both preservation of variance and a measure of the variance associated 
with the imputation procedure can be obtained by the multiple imputa- 
tion procedure advocated by Rubin. What is required is that two or more 
values be assigned to each  data point,  using a distribution  of  values 
conditional on individual  (firm) characteristics.  The variance  of  the 
stochastic component for like individuals then gives a measure of  the 
variation due to  the imputation procedure. In addition, the machinery for 
generating multiple imputations makes it easy to do sensitivity analysis of 
alternative imputation rules and their impact on the population statistics. 
Value of  the Imputations 
Of the numbers presented, C(TC) appears the most useful. It adds to 
information that can be easily collected from household surveys. The 
accounting for employer costs other than WSAL appears well grounded 
in good measurements. The estimates related to V(TC) appear flawed, 
and if recomputed could tell us something about the relationship between 
employer costs of compensation and the movement of household budget 
constraints in different groups of workers. 
The value of  PTW is particularly obscure. PTW differs from WSAL 284  Timothy M. Smeeding 
largely because of VHOL; those imputations are particularly weak since 
appropriate information on employees was not available in the CPS to 
perform an allocation. 
Tenure in the job had to be imputed before employer data could be 
used to assign expected number of paid holidays by occupation-industry 
class. (Loss of  variance would appear to be particularly important as 
small and large firms in the same industry are unlikely to have the same 
vacation accruals.) 
In addition,  VHOL is primarily a technique for income averaging 
within the year and not subject to either the scale or tax questions nor to 
the in-kind consumption that dominate Smeeding’s discussion. 
The fringe benefits that are added to WSAL are valued as premiums 
paid to provide contingent income or benefits. The worker whose cancer 
treatment is paid by an employer contribution to health insurance does 
not receive a greater income than his healthy coworker. However, the 
amount of  WSAL reported to CPS is cash realized from employment 
activities including sick pay. Thus the worker who receives cancer treat- 
ment will report a payment for time not worked while his healthy co- 
worker  does not.  Smeeding estimates PTW by  subtracting the same 
insurance premium for both workers from reported WSAL. This proce- 
dure preserves an appropriate expectation but gives extremely mislead- 
ing estimates of the variance of PTW. The role of sick pay in maintaining 
WSAL for part-year workers is obscured, while for a majority of workers 
who draw no sick pay PTW is understated. It is extremely difficult to 
anticipate how this may bias computation of  the change in Gini from 
PTW to WSAL-among  covered workers those with smaller PTW will 
benefit because of the inverse correlation of PTW and sick pay. However, 
sick leave benefits may well be concentrated among those with higher 
PTW, offsetting  the former  effect.  One would clearly prefer  to use 
WSAL rather than PTW. Precisely because fringe benefits are highly 
variable across workers, the presentation of measures of variance should 
be added to the measures’ central tendency in tables 6.2-6.7.  Smeeding 
should provide tabulations where the value of CPS household and family 
characteristics is fully exploited. 
Need for Additional Data 
Smeeding comments that if imputation does not produce useful results, 
a large-scale survey involving both employers and employees would be 
required to produce information on total compensation. Smeeding has 
shown that some additional knowledge can be produced by imputation. 
However, the value of  that knowledge would be much more secure if 
some small-sample data collections were undertaken from an appropri- 
ately structured sample of  employers and employees. To validate the 
present results, one could start with a representative sample of employers 285  Size Distribution of  Wage and Nonwage Compensation 
and collect personal characteristics from a sample of  their employees. 
This would be a validating procedure much like that of  Ferber and his 
collaborators (1969) in testing the validity of household reports of savings 
and share holdings. Any information of this kind, and some is included in 
the Leibowitz paper in this volume, should be used in validating the 
simulation results. 
I conclude: 
1. This is a path-breaking effort. Census, BLS, and Smeeding are to be 
commended. 
2.  Correction  of  the tax  factor will  give us  an  enormously  useful 
measure of employee valuation. Further work might well be undertaken 
to attach discounts (2,) to health insurance benefits received by spouses 
who have overlapping coverage. 
3.  In any replication of  this effort greater attention needs to be paid to 
preserving variance among employers and imparting that to the house- 
hold data. The technique of  multiple imputations appears ready to assist 
in that task, and its the task of assessing changes in variance that would be 
associated with alternative imputation procedures. 
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